Senate Bill 1504, would reverse the Supreme Courts decision this year which gives a federal judge the ability to throw out a lawsuit, before discovery, if he does not think it is "plausible". That's a lot of discretion without any guidance, and keeping the case away from a jury based upon personal biases.  

Senate Bill 1504 is designed to return the standard to what it was prior to 2007, when the Court handed down its ruling in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. That case and another — Ashcroft v. Iqbal from the most recent term — have raised the standard that pleaders must meet to avoid having their cases quickly tossed. Specter, in remarks prepared for the Senate floor, accused the Court’s majorities of making an end run around precedent with the two recent cases. 

“The effect of the Court’s actions will no doubt be to deny many plaintiffs with meritorious claims access to the federal courts and, with it, any legal redress for their injuries,” Specter said. “I think that is an especially unwelcome development at a time when, with the litigating resources of our executive-branch and administrative agencies stretched thin, the enforcement of federal antitrust, consumer protection, civil rights and other laws that benefit the public will fall increasingly to private litigants.”

At issue is how specific a pleading must be under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 requires that a complaint include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” while Rule 12 allows for the dismissal of complaints that are vague or that fail to state a claim. Under Iqbal, a 5-4 decision written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, many courts are now requiring more-specific facts that aren’t often available until discovery.

Senator Arlin Specter, introduced Senate Bill 1551 on July 30, 2009, seeking to do just that. The Bill called th "Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009," is currently co-sponsored by Edward Kaufman [D-DE], John Reed [D-RI] and Sheldon Whitehouse [D-RI]. The Bill seeks to amend the SEC Act of 1934 subject to liability in a private civil action any person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person (aids and abets) in violation of that act. The Senator's goal is to restore the ability to sue third parties in securities fraud lawsuits as freely as you could before the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Stoneridge v. Scientific Atlanta (Supreme Court docket).

The main provision of the Bill states:

For purposes of any private civil action implied under this title, any person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person in violation of this title, or of any rule or regulation issued under this title, shall be deemed to be in violation of this title to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided.’.

Senator Spector"s floor speech follows: 

 Mr. President. I have sought recognition to urge support for the legislation I just introduced, the Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009. My legislation would overturn two errant decisions of the Supreme Court--Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 1994, and Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 522 U.S. 148, 2008, by amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to authorize a private right of action for aiding-and-abetting liability.

 Act's main anti-fraud provision, §10(b), makes it "unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly," to commit acts of fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Nearly fifty years ago the Court implied a private right of action under §10(b). The result was that investors could recover financial losses caused by violations of 10(b) and the companion regulation issued by the SEC commonly known as "Rule 10b-5."

Until Central Bank, every circuit of the Federal Court of Appeals had concluded that §10(b)'s private right of action allowed recovery not only against the person who directly undertook a fraudulent act--the so-called primary violator--but also anyone who aided and abetted him. A five-Justice majority in Central Bank, intent on narrowing §10(b)'s scope, held that its private right of action extended only to primary violators.

When Congress debated the legislation that became the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, PSLRA, then-SEC chairman Arthur Levitt and others urged Congress to overturn Central Bank. Congress declined to do so. The PSLRA authorized only the Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC, to bring aiding-and- abetting enforcement litigation.

It is time for us to revisit that judgment. The massive frauds involving Enron, Refco, Tyco, Worldcom, and countless other lesser-known companies during the last decade have taught us that a stock issuer's auditors, bankers, business affiliates, and lawyers--sometimes called "secondary actors"--all too often actively participate in and enable the issuer's fraud. Federal Judge Gerald Lynch recently observed in a decision calling on Congress to reexamine Central Bank that secondary actors are sometimes "deeply and indispensably implicated in wrongful conduct." In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d. 304, 318 n.15, S.D.N.Y. 2009. Professor John Coffee of Columbia Law School, a renowned expert on the regulation of the securities markets, has even laid much of the blame for the major corporate frauds of this [sic].

The immunity from suit that Central Bank confers on secondary actors has removed much-needed incentives for them to avoid complicity in and even help prevent securities fraud, and all too often left the victims of fraud uncompensated for their losses. Enforcement actions by the SEC have proved to be no substitute for suits by private plaintiffs. The SEC's litigating resources are too limited for the SEC to bring suit except in a small number of cases, and even when the SEC does bring suit, it cannot recover damages for the victims of fraud.

Last year's decision in Stoneridge made matters still worse for defrauded investors. Central Bank had at least held open the possibility that secondary actors who themselves undertake fraudulent activities prescribed by §10(b) could be "held liable as ..... primary violator[s]." Stoneridge has largely foreclosed that possibility. A divided Court held that §10(b)'s private right of action did not "reach" two vendors of a cable company that entered into sham transactions with the company knowing that it would publicly report the transactions in order to inflate its stock price. The Court conceded that the suppliers engaged in fraudulent conduct prescribed by §10(b), but held that they were not liable in a private action because only the issuer, not they, communicated the transaction to the public. That remarkable conclusion put the Court at odds with even the Republican Chairman of the SEC.

My legislative response would take the limited, but important, step amending of the Exchange Act to authorize a private right of action under §10(b) (and other, less commonly invoked, provisions of the Act) against a secondary actor who provides "substantial assistance" to a person who violates §10(b). Any suit brought under my proposed amendment would, of course, be subject to the heightened pleading standards, discovery-stay procedures, and other defendant-protective features of the PSLRA.

On Thursday, September 17, the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs held a hearing entitled to consider the Bill, entitled  "Evaluating S. 1551: The Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009." S. 1551.  Sen. Arlen Specter's chaired the hearing. The witnesses were John C. Coffee, Columbia University School of Law; Patrick J Szymanski, General Counsel, Change to Win (a group of labor unions); Tanya Solov, Director, Illinois Securities Department, of behalf of the North American Securities Administrators Association; Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., a partner in Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, NYC; and Adam C. Pritchard, University of Michigan Law School. Coffee, Szymanski and Solov testified in favor of the Bill. Their can be found here:

The issue: Whether stock purchasers are entitled to utilize a lesser variant of the "fraud on the market" doctrine, calledthe "integrity of the market" doctine, to create a rebuttable presumption of reliance, when a stock is maniplutated in a non-verbal way.

In Desai v. Deutsche Bank Securities (9th Cir. - July 29, 2009), a Ninth Circuit panel held that the lower court was correct in refusing to certify a class action based on market manipulation of the stock of GenesisIntermedia, Inc. by various bad actors, including various entities of Deutsche Bank, and one of its Canadian employees. The market manipulation scheme was complex, the Court accepted that "the scheme had driven GENI's Stock price from $12 per share to over $52 per share." It now trades for pennies. Plaintiffs sued and sought to certify a class of those who purchased the stock during the market manipulation.

Judge Wilson, in the Central District of California, refused to certify the class because each individual member of the class would have to prove its own personal reliance, presumably, the lack of market manipulation, and therefore individual questions of fact predominated. The appellate panel, consisting of Judge John T. Noonan, who wrote the per curiam opinion, and Justices Diermuid F. OScannlain, and Susan P. Graber, agreed.

Justices Noonan and Graber believed that they could reverse the lower court only for a clear abuse of discretion. Plaintiffs had conceded that they needed to prove reliance. ( I'm not sure I would have conceded reliance in a market manipulation case, though I would have conceded lack of knowledge is required). Justice Noonan then drew the battle lines:

Reliance can be presumed in two situations. In omission cases, courts can presume reliance when the information withheld is material pursuant to Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). Reliance can also be presumed in certain circumstances under the so-called “fraud on the market theory.” Basic INc. V Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-49 (1988),Precisely to which cases this presumption applies—that is, to misrepresentation, to omission, to manipulation cases, or to some combination of the three—is an issue the parties contest on appeal. The two presumptions are conceptually distinct.

As explained by the Court, the fraud on the market theory is “based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market, the price of a company’s stock is determined by the available material information regarding the company and its business.” Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. at 241 (internal quotation marks omitted).

So far so good!

But then , Justice Noonan loses his way by picking and choosing verbage from cases that statethat the fraud on the market presumtionis available "only" when a plaintiff alleges a material misrepresentation or omission realting to a stock sold in an efficient market. On examination, however, it appear these cases are notmarket manipulation cases, probably because, up until now, they have been so rare or well hidden.

Butplaintiffs hadconceded that they could not prove an efficient market. (An efficient market quickly digests new information...from almost any source...causing the stock price to quickly adjusts to incorporate that new information. A thinly traded stock might not absorb the information quickly and therefore any news may not create a price reaction for weeks. In such a case, the disparity between individual investors knowledge becomes an issue. ) Having so conceded, they could not utilize the traditional definition of the fraud on the market presumption.

As for the Affiliated Ute presumption,the lower court rejected the theory that a manipulation was, in essence or fact, an omission. ( A holding with which I strongly disagree).

Applying a "clear abuse of discretion" standard, Judge Noonan agreed.The Affiliated Ute presumption has only been applied to cases of omission when there exists a duty to speak. The Court refused to extend the presumption to manipulative conductwhich "has always been distinct " from omissions., for example, in Rule 10b-5. The Court then claims to"follow" the 10th Circuit in Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2000)which is not a market manipulation case. In fact the word "manipulation"only appears once in the lengthy opinion. For those who remember the 1989 Miniscribe class action, Wiles is a related individual case based upon a fraud whereby Miniscribe cooked its books by shipping bricks instead of product to warehouses, thereby overstating revenues and earnings....one of the good ol' frauds).

Regardless, to the extent that an omission might have existed, the plaintiffs failed to allege a duty. And the Court refuses to even attempt to discuss any duty of market participants to the market.

Next plaintiffs argued for a modification of the fraud on the market theory to fit such a situation, and claimed a rebuttable presumption based upon investorsreliance upon the "integrity of the market." The lower court rejected this too.

Judge Noonanfirst concedes that investors rely on the integrity of the market, citing Basic:

[T]he theory presumes first that “[a]n investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price.” Id. at 247. Second, “[b]ecause most publicly available information is reflected in market price, an investor’s reliance on any public material misrepresentations . . . may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.” Id.

He notes plaintiffs argument that investors "typically rely on the 'integrity of the market,' that is, that no one has destroyed its efficiency by manipulation [and] when manipulation allegedly destroys the efficiency of the market, and with it the reliability of the market’s price." And he does not disagree. But when asked to find, that as a matter of law, plaintiffs are entitle to such a presumption, Judge Noonan can only summon the argument, "We are chary."

The Court argues, no authority compelled the lower court to adopt this new theory and that the Supreme Court has evidenced a "restrictive view" of private suits, and to not extend 10b-5 beyond its present boundaries, citing Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 773.

The Court unfortunately pulls the Stoneridge quote out of context. In Stoneridge, the issue was framed as creating a private cause of action for aiders and abettors...a cause of action rejected more long ago in Central Bank. Hence the full quote is:

Concerns with the judicial creation of a private cause of action caution against its expansion. The decision to extend the cause of action is for Congress, not for us. Though it remains the law, the §10(b) private right should not be extended beyond its present boundaries. See Virginia Bankshares, supra, at 1102 (“[T]he breadth of the [private right of action] once recognized should not, as a general matter, grow beyond the scope congressionally intended”); see also Central Bank, supra, at 173 (determining that the scope of conduct prohibited is limited by the text of §10(b)).

Plaintiffs were not seeking to extend 10b-5 or create a private cause of action. The law clearly forbids market manipulation and private causes of action have existed under this law for decades.

Justice Noonan, thus, avoids any analytical examination of the requested presumption. Instead he concludes merely "that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to adopt the integrity of the market presumption." In other words...he punts on what the law is or should be.

O'Scannlain, on the other hand, goes after his colleagues for dodging the legal issue, making out a good argument for en banc review:

Unfortunately, however, we are left to conclude abruptly with a declaration of the result, for we cannot agree on the correct approach. I believe that, because the validity of a presumption of reliance in securities class actions is a matter of law and because errors of law are per se abuses of discretion, we must explicitly decide whether Investors are entitled to this novel presumption as a matter of law. I write separately to explain my view.

Even so, O'Scannlain goes on to find the presumption legally unsupportable and logically inadvisable. On the legal side, he can onlysummon citations to non-market manipulation cases that have no application to these facts. On the logic side, he actually makes plaintiffs case. He starts by admitting:

Most investors do, I think it fair to say, assume that the markets are not corrupt. Cf. Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47 (“It has been noted that ‘it is hard to imagine that there ever is a buyer or seller who does not rely on market integrity. Who would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?’ ” (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys. Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982))).

But then he concludes, in logic that escapes rigor, that if the presumption were adopted, then no plaintiff would ever have to prove reliance. In so concluding, he simply forgets that plaintffs seek only to apply this presumption to market manipulation cases....which the Court has just found to be distinct from misrepresentation and omission cases, legally.

Similarly he argues that the theory "would permit a presumption of reliance no matter how unlikely it is that the market price in question would actually reflect the alleged manipulation." Again,how is it that the presumption of reliance would not still require the plaintiffs to prove that the price during the entire class period was inflated by the manipulation, and by how much? O'Scannlain does not say.

Revealingly, O'Scannlain seems to back track and recognize theproblems with his concurring opinion inhis concluding. This footnote accurately captures the entire issue...and best statement for l an en banc courtto tackle:

I recognize the possibility that certain allegations of manipulative conduct might change the application of the fraud on the market theory. This is because the plaintiff in manipulation cases often alleges that a defendant directly manipulated the price. Certainly, a plaintiff must still show that the market in question could absorb into the price the misinformation communicated by the alleged manipulation. But need a plaintiff show the same type of proof of an efficient market in a manipulation case as is required in a misrepresentation case? Although I note the doctrinal wrinkle, this is a question I would agree we actually do not need to reach, because Investors forsook the fraud on the market theory.

Justice Graber, in her concurring opinion, defends Justice Noonan's contention that the Court need not reach the legal question:

All we have to decide is whether the district court had to recognize that new theory. If so, then the court made a mistake of law (and hence abused its discretion, see Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”)).

I agree with O'Scannlain that the Court should have addressed, as a full panel, a broader application of the fraud on the market theory in market manipulation cases. An efficient market should not and, indeed, cannot be a requirement where there are no statements to be absorbed by the market participants in making their decisions. The Court should not have said that a lower Court has no duty to find the right law for the right circumstances, even if it is a new application of a principle. How else does law evolve. It has to start in the lower Courts. Justices Noonan and Graber, shirked their duty.

But in the end, it may not matter that much to the plaintiffs bar. The reason why there is no authority on the subject is, as O'Scannlain states, simply reflects "the relative rarity of" manipulative conduct cases. So the impact will be minimal on securities fraud cases.....except now that the fear of a lawsuit is gone, maybe the fraudsters will start crawling through the cracks.

Shaun Martin's Blog California Appellate Report, has a very good discussion and first analysis of the case at Desai v. Deutsche Bank Securities (9th Cir. - July 29, 2009).

 

Chairman Schapiro discusses the SEC proposal:
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Text of Chairman's statement

Washington, D.C., July 22, 2009 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today voted unanimously to propose measures intended to curtail "pay to play" practices by investment advisers that seek to manage money for state and local governments. The measures are designed to prevent an adviser from making political contributions or hidden payments to influence their selection by government officials.

The proposals relate to money managed by state and local governments under important public programs. Such programs include public pension plans that pay retirement benefits to government employees, retirement plans in which teachers and other government employees can invest money for their retirement, and 529 plans that allow families to invest money for college.

To help manage this money, state and local governments often hire outside investment advisers who may directly manage this money and provide advice about which investments they should make. In return for their advice, the investment advisers typically charge fees that come out of the assets of the pension funds for which the advice is provided. If the advisers manage mutual funds or other investments that are options in a plan, the advisers receive fees from the money in those investments.

Investment advisers are often selected by one or more trustees who are appointed by elected officials. While such a selection process is common, fairness can be undermined if advisers seeking to do business with state and local governments make political contributions to elected officials or candidates, hoping to influence the selection process.

The selection process also can be undermined if elected officials or their associates ask advisers for political contributions or otherwise make it understood that only advisers who make contributions will be considered for selection. Hence the term "pay to play." Advisers and government officials who engage in pay to play practices may try to hide the true purpose of contributions or payments.

"Pay to play practices can result in public plans and their beneficiaries receiving sub-par advisory services at inflated prices," said SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro. "Our proposal would significantly curtail the corrupting and distortive influence of pay to play practices."

Andrew J. Donohue, Director of the SEC's Division of Investment Management, added, "Pay to play serves the interests of advisers to public pension plans rather than the interests of the millions of pension plan beneficiaries who rely on their advice. The rule we are proposing today would help ensure that advisory contracts are awarded on professional competence, not political influence."

The rule being proposed for public comment by the SEC includes prohibitions intended to capture not only direct political contributions by advisers, but other ways advisers may engage in pay to play arrangements.

Restricting Political Contributions

Under the proposed rule, an investment adviser who makes a political contribution to an elected official in a position to influence the selection of the adviser would be barred for two years from providing advisory services for compensation, either directly or through a fund.

The rule would apply to the investment adviser as well as certain executives and employees of the adviser. Additionally, the rule would apply to political incumbents as well as candidates for a position that can influence the selection of an adviser.

There is a de minimis provision that permits an executive or employee to make contributions of up to $250 per election per candidate if the contributor is entitled to vote for the candidate.

Banning Solicitation of Contributions

The proposed rule also would prohibit an adviser and certain of its executives and employees from coordinating, or asking another person or political action committee (PAC) to:

1. Make a contribution to an elected official (or candidate for the official's position) who can influence the selection of the adviser.
2. Make a payment to a political party of the state or locality where the adviser is seeking to provide advisory services to the government.

Banning Third-Party Solicitors

The proposed rule also would prohibit an adviser and certain of its executives and employees from paying a third party, such as a solicitor or placement agent, to solicit a government client on behalf of the investment adviser.

Restricting Indirect Contributions and Solicitations

Finally, the proposed rule would prohibit an adviser and certain of its executives and employees from engaging in pay to play conduct indirectly, such as by directing or funding contributions through third parties such as spouses, lawyers or companies affiliated with the adviser, if that conduct would violate the rule if the adviser did it directly. This provision would prevent advisers from circumventing the rule by directing or funding contributions through third parties.

Public comments on today's proposed rule must be received by the Commission within 60 days after their publication in the Federal Register. 

http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-168.htm

In a recent letter Dreier wrote to convince the Judge who is going to sentence him, we see another amazing sad story of refusing to fail at all costs...and perhaps a true lack of self esteem. While Madoff never appeared to lack self-esteem, he did grow up on the wrong side of the tracks...so to speak...for the social circles he wanted to accept him so badly. Dreier just outright confesses to this desire. His letter is reprinted below in its near entirety. If you are unfamiliar with the crime...just read on. Dreier lays it our for you. Read it for what it reveals...and skip the excuses:

Marc S. Dreier

c/o Law Offices of Gerald Shargel

570 Lexington Ave., 45 th Fl.

New York, NY 10022 

 

July 7, 2009 

 

Dear Judge Rakoff, 

 

Please consider this letter in connection with my sentencing on July 13, 2009. 

 

I know of course that no words can diminish the harm I have caused to so many people. Those who were victimized by my bogus loans lost millions of dollars. Clients of my law firm lost escrow funds they entrusted to me. The attorneys and staff at my firm who put their faith in me lost their jobs. My friends and colleagues have been tainted by their association with me. And the families of all these people have no doubt shared in the suffering — as has my own family. My children have lost the father they knew, as well as their good name and the happiness they deserve. I have betrayed the people I care about most, and I suffer every day from the shame and self-loathing and regret with which I will always have to live. 

 

My crimes are inexcusable. I expect and deserve a significant prison sentence. 

 

Nevertheless, I am writing to give some context to what I did — certainly not to minimize my crimes but to try to explain how a person with my background and advantages came to do the unconscionable. Perhaps in learning how I made these terrible decisions which have ruined my life, others may avoid such mistakes. I have requested that my attorneys file this as an open letter, available in the public record, in the hope that it may do some good as a warning to others not to follow in my path. 

 

I was raised in New York by a loving family. in a comfortable home. I always succeeded in school. I attended Yale College and Harvard Law School. After law school I spent 20 years in several prominent law firms, first as an associate, then as a partner. I performed well, but I was achieving less satisfaction and recognition than I expected. Colleagues of mine and certainly clients of mine were doing much better financially and seemingly enjoying more status. By my mid-forties I felt crushed by a sense of underachievement.

 

So I started my own firm in 1996. My intention was to try to attract lawyers who, like myself, were dissatisfied with large firms and were looking for a more gratifying way to have a sophisticated practice. I had virtually no cash and very few clients. but I was able to grow the firm modestly over the next few years by investing my life in it. 

 

I had planned poorly. however, for the expenses. I couldn't get bank loans without better credit or collateral, so I was funding the firm partially with advances from some clients but primarily through "factors" who charged exorbitant fees and interest and were highly intrusive in monitoring the firm's accounts. By 2001 I was deeply in debt. 

 

In January 2002, my wife sued for divorce. I had been married for 15 years. We have two children. We entered into a settlement agreement under which I took on financial obligations to her and our children which were actually far more than I could afford. I believed that my fledgling law firm could not survive a contested divorce. 

 

All of this left me feeling overwhelmed — by my debt, by a disappointing career, by a failed marriage. And so, incomprehensibly, in 2002 I started stealing. First, I invaded some settlement proceeds due a client. Then I arranged a few bogus investments with some individuals. And soon I stumbled upon the brazen idea of arranging fictitious loans from hedge funds, ostensibly to my principal client (the real estate developer referenced in the Indictment), and diverting the loan proceeds to myself. 

 

As I sit here today, I can't remember or imagine why I didn't stop myself. It all seems so obviously deplorable now. I recall only that I was desperate for some measure of the success that I felt had eluded me. I felt that my law firm was my last chance to make a mark for myself, and I was fearful of seeing it fail. I know of course that this amounted to nothing more than self pity, but this was my state of mind when I became a criminal. I gave in to being overwhelmed by the anxieties of life that we are all expected to cope with every day, and most people do, but I just could not manage to do so. I had no one close to me with whom I could talk. I had isolated myself, both personally and professionally. I lost my perspective and my moral grounding, and really, in a sense, I just lost my mind. 

 

At the beginning, I spent most of the money on growing the law firm. Much of the money also went to servicing the "debt" itself. But, as time went on, I was more and more self-indulgent.I bought extravagant things — a beach house, an apartment, a boat, expensive art. Obviously, other men suffer through divorce and "mid-life crisis" and manage not to steal. And, other people grow their business without resorting to crime. I just wasn't in control of myself. 

 

It is hard to explain how my crimes in 2002 reached the level that they did by 2008. Certainly I never intended when this began to steal on the scale I eventually did. I took the first money thinking that I could and would repay it shortly with revenue derived from the law firm. Soon, however, I exhausted the money, and it was evident not only that I would be unable to repay the initial "loans" but that I would need more. I had stepped in a quicksand of spending. By 2008 I had hired over 250 lawyers and opened additional offices in Los Angeles. Pittsburgh and Connecticut. The expenses were more and more uncontrollable, and the "loans" became more and more expensive. As the credit markets worsened, hedge funds were demanding much higher interest rates and, in many cases. substantial discounts to principal. In some cases, when I desperately needed new money to pay back loans becoming due, I was selling loans for 60-65 cents on the dollar, meaning that I was paying back far more principal than the hedge funds were actually paying me, which obviously was dramatically deepening the hole I was in. 

 

In this way, without ever actually planning to. I found myself running a massive Ponzi scheme with no apparent way out. No doubt as is typical in Penn schemes, there was always the unrealistic expectation, or at least the hope, that I could use the "borrowed" money to eventually make it all work out. Obviously, and predictably, I was unable to do so. 

 

When I was no longer able to pay off old "loans" to the real estate developer by creating new ones, I placed a few other fictitious loans, in much the same manner, by using instead as the purported borrower a Toronto pension fund that I had once represented. Finally, when there were no loans I could invent, I began to pull money again from a few of the firm's escrow accounts, knowing of course that it was terribly wrong but still thinking that I could somehow restore the funds in short order. Typically, I did restore this money, but in early December 2008 I was unable to restore about $40 million to one such client account as the due date for its disposition was nearing. As a result, I engaged in the most desperate and irrational act yet - impersonating an attorney from the pension fund in Toronto in order to "close" a loan from a hedge fund which would have given me the funds to return the escrow money. I knew very well that this time I would most likely be caught. I was caught, and that escrow money was not restored. 

 

In some sense, being caught was a relief. I had been living a self-inflicted nightmare, scrambling every day to sustain the charade. I had three "full time" jobs: First, I was managing a large active law firm, with all the daily challenges that come with such responsibility. Second, I was head of the firm's litigation department, with a very heavy active practice and caseload of my own. Finally, I was managing a huge portfolio of fraudulent loans, which required me to constantly prepare and update bogus financial statements and loan documents, field inquiries from lenders and prospective lenders, arrange payments of principal and interest on existing loans, obtain new loans as old ones matured, and do all that was necessary to keep the scam a secret. At the same time, I was trying to spend as much time as possible caring for my son, who lived with me full-time, and my daughter, who lived about half the time with each parent. It was all I could do to get through each day, and each day it got harder. It was a frantic life which I had created for myself, and it left me exhausted and impaired. 

 

Your Honor has rightfully observed that as a lawyer I have dishonored the legal profession, and I am very painfully ashamed of that. My whole ambition in life was to be a lawyer who would distinguish himself and honor the profession. Over the course of 33 years of practice, I represented many clients well and devotedly. I made my work as a lawyer the center of my life. 

 

Obviously, I then strayed very far from those goals. I lost myself to my ambition and sacrificed everything else.

 

Recently, I have had the opportunity to read the letters sent to the Court by the victims of my offense. I am shamed by these letters. During the time I was committing my fraud. I tried to convince myself that I was hurting only "institutions' . and not "individuals - (as if that were less contemptible), because I was borrowing almost entirely from hedge funds. I knew of course then and I know now that this was all nonsense - my fraud devastated "real people" in a very real way. The letters from these individual victims show their suffering first-hand. I will only add that I believed these individuals would not be harmed. because I always made certain that there were sufficient funds still available to repay them when their money came due. At the time of my arrest, there were in fact sufficient funds in the firm's account (over $10 million) to repay all f these individuals. After my arrest, while I was jailed in Toronto, I instructed the controller of the firm to transfer $10 million to a separate non-law firm account, believing that by doing so I could shield the money owed to these individuals from any competing claims until I returned to New York. As I understand it now, however, several individuals remain unpaid in the wake of the firm's collapse, and these individuals who trusted the firm I controlled have been terribly harmed. I never intended for them to lose their money, but obviously I am responsible for even he unintended consequences of my wrongdoing. 

 

Since my arrest, I have done whatever little I can to start to make amends for my crimes. From the outset I acknowledged my guilt. I never considered putting my victims through the burden of a trial. I have also cooperated fully with the Receiver and Trustees appointed by the ourt. In numerous meetings and discussions I have tried to help them identify and recover funds and other assets to start to compensate those who are owed money. 

 

More than that, I can only explain to the people I betrayed how I came to make these mistakes and express my profound remorse. In the brief time I may have to speak at my sentencing, I hope to express my remorse to those I have hurt. Perhaps at least they will feel some degree of my shame, which I will have to live with for the rest of my life. 

 

For rne, the punishment that I receive from this Court will only be part of my sentence. I have already been disgraced beyond anything I could ever have imagined. Despite whatever good I once accomplished in my life, and what I had hoped to accomplish, I will always be remembered as a thief. I have lost all my friends. I have lost my law firm, my law license and all that I ever owned. 1 have seen my family suffer the unimaginable. I have lost my past and y future. I have lost everything a man can lose. And now I will lose my freedom as well, and rightly so. 

 

All that I have left in my life is the prospect of still sharing in my children's lives, both while I am in prison and, I pray, for some time thereafter. My son is 19; my (laughter is 17. We are very close. I have devastated their lives, and unfortunately nothing I do now can diminish that. I can only try to be there for them to whatever extent I can. 

 

I don't know what gives some men the strength of character to lead virtuous lives for all of their lives, and what causes others, such as myself, to lose their way. There is no excuse whatsoever for what I have done. I have explained it the best I can. 1 will try to learn from this, and hopefully others will as well. 

 

Respectfully yours.

Marc S. Dreier

According to the FDA, as of Dec. 2007, Matrixx was required to provide reports of adverse reactions to the agency per the Dietary Supplement and Nonprescription Drug Consumer Protection Act, which President Bush signed into law Dec. 22, 2006. The Act requires manufacturers, packers, or distributors whose name appears on a nonprescription drug or dietary supplement product label to notify FDA of any serious adverse event report associated with the product's use within 15 business days of receipt of such information. The industry was given a one-year grace period to begin to comply with the law.

In a letter to Matrixx, dated June 16, 2007, the FDA informed Matrixx it concluded that certain Zicam products may pose serious risks to consumers who use them, and that Matrixx marketing practices violate several laws relating to the products.

It also stated that the "agency is aware that Matrixx appears to have more than 800 reports related to loss of sense of smell associated with Zicam Cold Remedy intranasal products" and directed Matrixx "to arrange ubmission of all reports related to loss of sense of smell associated with Zicam Cold Remedy intranasal products" and to "indicate which of these reports have been previously submitted to the FDA."

Upon release of this letter by the FDA, Matrixx stock plummeted from approximately $19 per share to less than $7 per share. From the FDA ranscript:

Lisa Stark: Thank you. Actually most of my questions have been
asked. But let me ask you one thing. You mentioned that I think it was
after December 2007 the companies had to provide adverse event reports
to the FDA. They didn't have to do so prior to that. Did this company
since that time provide any adverse event reports to you based visa vie
these products?

Deb Autor(FDA): As Dr. Lee said, the reports that we have are
from consumers and healthcare providers. And in the warning letter we
have asked Matrixx to provide to us the more than 800 reports that we
know that they have relating to the lose of sense of smell associated
with the Zicam Cold Remedy intranasal products.Those have not been
provided to the agency at this time.

Lisa Stark: Should they have been under the current regulations?
Should you have received those reports?

Deb Autor: I can't address that question today.

On July 23, 2009, Matrixx acknowledged the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is launching an informal inquiry. Since December 2007, insiders, including the Executive VP and CFO, the VP of Sales and the VP of Research and Development, have sold more than $2.7 million worth of Matrixx shares.

According to new reports, the COO said Matrixx first learned during the FDA's on-site inspection last month that the federal agency wanted all such "adverse events" reports immediately after consumers filed them with the company. Matrixx, acting on its legal advice, thought the company merely had to make such reports available to FDA inspectors during on-site visits."We have complaints here, clearly, but we weren't required to send them; at least we didn't believe we were required to
send them," he said.

The Hagens Berman press release regarding their investigation of this matter can be found here.

A second case, filed about the same time...and which went up and down on an appeal over pleading issues, however met a different end (at least for he time being.) Just days ago, a Judge in the Northern Distict of California, threw out the securities fraud class action against Oracle on a summary judgement motion. Much of the opinon is based on the failure to tie the alleged fraud to the reasons the stock dropped. The case was by no means a clean case. Oracle had undisclosed messes at hand, and Larry Ellison sold almost $1 billion in stock just before the disclosures that caused the stock to drop. The problem, according to the Court, is that the stock seemed to drop based on an unexpected slowdown...or predicted slowdown in sales that cropped up during the last few weeks...not the accounting issues and product issues the plaintiffs case was built upon. The opinion can be found here. This case is a model showing why defendants  never settle before trial.

I observed both cases in their infancy and through much of the discovery while I worked with many of the attorneys involved. The energy in prosecuting such cases is intense, and the attorneys devoted much of the last 8 years to these cases. I am both happy and saddened for my former colleagues. But that is the life of a securities fraud litigator...and perhaps any litigator. The difference is that the defense attorneys get paid either way.

Such evidence is much needed because the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) established a preference of granting lead plaintiff status to plaintiffs with the largest financial stake in the class action, thus providing institutions an opportunity to critically affect the litigation by serving as the lead plaintiffs. Given the costs of serving as a lead plaintiff and the free rider problem, institutional investors may not want to lead class action lawsuits even if they hold the largest financial stake in the defendant firm. Consequently, it is important to provide empirical evidence on the effectiveness of institutional monitoring through class action litigation. In addition to documenting the implications of the lead plaintiff provision in the PSLRA Act, our findings also underscore the important monitoring role of institutions, from both an immediate disciplining of management as well as a long-term corporate governance perspective.

The authors hypothesized that generally an institutional investor will be a "free-rider" and take the benefits of class actions led by other individual plaintiffs, unless the potential benefits to them outweighed their agency costs. The study, as described by the authors, used a sample of 1,811 securities class actions filed between 1996 and 2005, and confirmed that hypothesis.Thus the study found that:

1. when the likelihood of winning is high, the potential damage is large, and the defendant firm is important to the institutional owners, institutional owners are more likely to step forward to serve as the lead plaintiff.
2. institutional investors are more likely to serve as the lead plaintiff when the lawsuit:
   • involves an accounting-related allegation,
   • has an accounting firm as the co-defendant,
   • has a longer class period, has a larger negative market reaction to the revelation event, and
   • has a larger potential investor loss.
3. the probability of having an institutional lead plaintiff is also higher when the defendant firm has a larger market capitalization, has a higher level of institutional holdings, and is operating in a high-tech industry.

The authors then sought to control forthese determinants to find our whether, even then, their was a difference in litigation outcomes when institutions became involved. Using multivariate regression analysis to control for these determinants of when institutions are likely to get involved, the authors concluded:

1. that relative to lawsuits with an individual lead plaintiff, lawsuits with an institutional lead plaintiff are less likely to be dismissed and have significantly larger settlements;
2. all types of institutions show significantly better litigation outcomes with public pension funds generating the largest settlement amount;
3. within three years of filing the lawsuit, defendant firms with institutional lead plaintiffs experience greater improvement in board independence than defendant firms with individual lead plaintiffs.

These findings should be reason enough for institutional investors to step forward and serve as lead plaintiffs. So institutions, get involved!